This article examines infant attachment styles from the perspective of cognitive and emotional subjectivity. We review new data that show that individual differences in infants' attachment behaviors in the traditional Strange Situation are related to (a) infants' subjective construals of infant-caregiver interactions, (b) their attention to emotional expressions, and (c) polymorphisms in the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene. We use these findings to argue that individual differences in infants' attachment styles reflect, in part, the subjective outcomes of objective experience as filtered through genetic biases in socioemotional information processing.
Human infants vary dramatically in their proclivity to seek and accept comfort and protection from others. These ordinary variations, readily observable in everyday behavior, have been empirically captured in the work of attachment theorists for more than three decades now (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1969 Bowlby, /1982 Cassidy & Shaver, 2008) . They are associated with a wide range of individual differences in psychological functioning in adults. Infants who rely on their caregivers with ease and confidence are classified as securely attached and experience stronger cognitive and language development (Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005) , healthier interpersonal relations (Sroufe et al., 2005) , and decreased risk of later mental health problems such as mood disorders, externalizing disorders, and dissociative and attentional disorders (Carlson, 1998; Clarke, Ungerer, Chahoud, Johnson, & Stiefel, 2002; Greenberg, 1999; Sroufe et al., 2005; Warren, Huston, Egeland, & Sroufe, 1997 ), compared to those who do not and are thus classified as insecurely attached.
Faced with this lengthy list of the costs of insecure attachment and the benefits of secure attachment, considerable time and effort has been devoted to rooting out their antecedents. Researchers now agree that objectively measurable differences in caregiving play an important role. Infants whose parents are sensitive and responsive are more than half as likely to be securely attached as infants whose parents are not (de Wolff & van IJzendoorn, 1997) .
Nonetheless, as striking as this conclusion is, these objective differences in parenting account for only a minority of the natural variance among infants, with effect sizes around r = .2 (de Wolff & van IJzendoorn, 1997; Goldsmith & Alansky, 1987) . The majority of the variance remains unaccounted for. In this article, we suggest that one overlooked source of variation may be individual differences in infants' subjective construal of the parenting they receive, in contrast to the actual parenting. In support of this proposal, we will argue (a) that infants routinely form representations that vary from objective reality, including representations of social interactions; (b) that relevant genotypic differences in socioemotional information processing are present in infancy; and (c) that these individual differences in socioemotional information processing plausibly constrain infants' construals of their own experience, including construals of the parenting they receive.
Subjective Construals
The attributions people make about their worlds go well beyond the objective information to which they have access. Subjective construals of experience are a well-accepted notion within social psychology, and in psychology in general (Asch, 1952; Baldwin, 1992; Bruner, 1957; Ross, 1990 ). Bowlby himself argued that early attachment relationships result in affectivecognitive models of social relations, which in turn filter and shade individuals' subsequent experiences of social interactions (1969/1982) . Indeed, there is now a great deal of evidence for individual differences in attachment-related construal processes in both adults and verbal children.
Attachment-Related Construals in Adults, Adolescents, and Verbal Children
Adults with secure attachment styles differ from those with insecure styles in terms of both the attributions they make of other's behaviors and the manner in which they process emotionally laden stimuli. In general, adults with insecure attachment styles tend to discount the support of others and overattribute negative intent to others (Collins & Feeney, 2004; Collins, Ford, Guichard, & Allard, 2006) . Insecure adults are also more sensitive to threatening emotional expressions and words. They are quicker to detect them (Fraley & Niedenthal, 2006) , more likely to avoid them (Dewitte, Koster, De Houwer, & Buysee, 2007) , and experience greater amygdala activation in response to them (Vrticka, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2008) . These findings are significant for understanding construal processes, insofar as emotional stimuli, particularly threatening stimuli, are known to influence both attentional and perceptual processes for associated stimuli, at least in part via the amygdala (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Dolan, 2002; E. Fox, 2005; N. A. Fox, Hane, & Pine, 2007; Most, Chun, Johnson, & Kiehl, 2006; Phelps, 2006; Pourtois & Vuilleumier, 2006; Schupp, Markus, Weike, & Hamm, 2003; Vuilleumier, 2005; Whalen, 1998) .
In children, a small handful of studies using story completion, enactment, and drawing tasks have found connections between children's attachment status and their construals of relationships. One theme repeatedly emerges. Children with secure attachments tend to have more positive expectations of parental accessibility and support than do insecure children, who are more likely to expect nonresponsiveness or rejection in parent-child interactions (Bretherton, Ridgeway, & Cassidy, 1990; Cassidy, 1988; Fury, Carlson, & Sroufe, 1997; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Ziv, Oppenheim, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2004) . Secure children are also more able to predict another child's appropriately negative emotions in response to parental separation (Bar-Haim, Sutton, Fox, & Marvin, 2000; Shouldice & Stevenson-Hinde, 1992) . In an interesting twist, Lewis et al. found that 13-year-olds' autobiographical memories of their own childhood relationships were more associated with their current life events than with their actual childhood attachment status, suggesting that not only do attachment representations change over time, but they are themselves sensitive to subjective construals (Lewis, Feiring, & Rosenthal, 2000) .
In studies of affective processing, several labs have found evidence of distorted or impoverished emotion recognition in young children with insecure attachments (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994; Laible & Thompson, 1998) , including the overattribution of hostile intent (Suess, Grossman, & Sroufe, 1992) . Belsky et al. (Belsky, Spritz, & Crnic, 1996) demonstrated the differential effect of attachment status on children's retention of positive and negative information. In response to stories told with both positively and negatively valenced information: securely attached children displayed superior recall for the positive information, while insecurely attached children displayed superior recall for the negative information.
In the related context of maltreated children, researchers have found quite powerful individual differences in children's construals of the social world, including but not limited to Dodge et al.'s original identification of a hostility bias in maltreated children (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, Pettit, Bates, & Valente, 1995) . Maltreated children also display other distortions of emotion recognition (Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000; Pollak & Kistler, 2002; Pollak & Sinha, 2002) as well as distinctly more negative construals of caregivers than nonmaltreated children, including diminished expectations of responsiveness to a child's distress (Bretherton, Oppenheim, Buchsbaum, Emde, & The MacArthur Narrative Group, 1990; Toth, Cicchetti, & Kim, 2002; Toth, Cicchetti, Macfie, & Emde, 1997) .
Subjective Construals in Preverbal Infants
Similar inquiries in infancy have been constrained by both theoretical and methodological limitations. Theoretically, subjective construals of reality require the ability to represent the world internally, as distinct from the sense data. Methodologically, this has been a famously tough nut to crack in the arena of infant development. While attachment theorists from Freud to Thompson have routinely invoked internal representations of the caregiver in their accounts of preverbal infant development (for reviews, see Ainsworth, 1969; Thompson, 2006) , for the most part, the field has lacked the methodology to either confirm or disconfirm their views. Researchers have relied instead on methods that persuasively document the behavioral differences among infants (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Waters & Deane, 1985) , yet are so closely entwined with the behaviors they are intended to explain that strong conclusions of distinct internal representations are impossible.
Recent advances in infant cognition, however, suggest a way forward. The visual habituation paradigm is one such advance that exploits infants' tendency to look longer at novel (or unexpected) events than at familiar (or expected) events (Spelke, 1985) . Generally speaking, if infants are shown a display repeatedly, their looking times will decline, presumably as a result of increasing familiarity with the display. Infants' visual attention to a new display will recover to the degree that they find it novel or different from the original. This fact can be used to tease apart the possible interpretations that infants assign to the events depicted in the displays.
Using this and similar methods, research in infant cognition now suggests that preverbal infants do have rich, mental lives and represent many of the same "abstract" features of experience that adults represent-that is, preverbal infants go well beyond the sensory input when representing and reasoning about the world around them, including social agents. Infants represent the spatiotemporal continuity of physical objects and actions even when the objects are out of sight (Baillargeon, 2004; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Termine, Hrynick, Kestenbaum, Gleitman, & Spelke, 1987) . They represent abstract aspects of sets, such as quantity, and can perform simple computations across them (Izard, Sann, Spelke, & Streri, 2009; Wynn, 1995; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 2005) . They represent the unobservable psychological causes of agentive behavior, including the goals and percepts of both humans (Johnson, Ok, & Luo, 2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Woodward, 1998) and generic, nonhuman agents (Johnson, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004) , and they can evaluate the rational means for achieving simple goals (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995) . Infants have even been shown to evaluate whether the interactions between two generic agents are positive or negative and prefer to interact with the positive agent (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003) . The world, as represented by infants, may be simpler than the world of adults, but it is nonetheless representationally rich, coherent, and undeniably subjective.
Extending these advances to the consideration of individual differences in social understanding, we propose that similar methodological approaches will show that individual, genetically influenced differences in infants' attention to social information, particularly information with emotional content, bias infants' perceptions of caregiving, and thus give rise to individual differences in internal working models, even in the absence of differences in caregiving.
Attachment-Related Construals in Preverbal Infants
While typically developing infants appear to converge on a generic commitment to the existence of psychological agents with goals, as well as the recognition that those agents and goals can be either helpful or harmful, there is still quite a bit of specific information for infants to learn about their individual social worlds that need not be shared by other infants. For instance, the stable relationships between specific agents and specific goals are likely to vary a great deal from one infant to the next. Experience for one infant may suggest that adults generally do have the goal of helping, while experience for another infant may suggest they generally do not. Bowlby argued that these sorts of expectations by an infant arise out the infant's early attachment experiences and amount to internal "working models of […] how his mother and other significant persons may be expected to behave, how he himself may be expected to behave, and how each interacts with all the others" (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 .
The Strange Situation procedure, designed by Ainsworth et al. (1978) , was researchers' attempt to capture and measure infants' internal working models. As strikingly predictive as this procedure has proven, the question of exactly how representational the organizing force behind strange situation behavior has remained. In recent studies, we have deployed the methods of infant cognition to address this issue using methods that are independent of the attachment behaviors they are intended to explain. In our first exploratory study (Johnson, Dweck, & Chen, 2007) , we used a visual habituation method to test whether infants' expectations of how a caregiver will respond to an infant's distress is related to their own attachment status. Infants were habituated to an animated event depicting the departure of a "mother" figure from an "infant" figure, as shown in Figure 1 . The figures were abstract geometric ovals, with the mother proportionately larger than the infant. As the mother figure moved away, the infant figure cried out. Securely attached infants, as assessed in Ainsworth's strange situation, seemed surprised and looked correspondingly longer at test displays in which the mother figure ignored the infant figure's cry and continued to move away, compared to insecurely attached infants who looked longer when the mother figure responded to the infant figure's cry by returning . Interestingly, as a group the insecurely attached infants all found the responsive caregiver behavior unexpected, regardless of whether their own insecurity manifested as avoidant or resistant behavior toward the caregiver.
In a second study reported in , we tested whether infants' expectations of a generic infant figure's behavior during a separation and reunion event also differed according to their own attachment status. In this case, we reasoned that insecurely avoidant and insecurely resistant infants should have quite different expectations of the infant figure's behavior, considering their own diverging behavior in the strange situation. Similar to securely attached infants, insecurely resistant infants tend to approach their caregivers at reunion. However, insecurely avoidant infants tend to withdraw. The infants were habituated to animations similar to those in the first study with the exception that the mother figure partially, but not completely, returned when the infant figure cried. After habituation our infant participants were shown displays in which the infant figure either approached the returning mother figure, or withdrew. As predicted, securely attached and insecurely resistant infants both found the infant figure's withdrawal unexpected and looked longer at that outcome. In parallel to their own behavior however, insecurely avoidant infants found this behavior unremarkable and looked much longer instead at outcomes in which the infant figure approached the caregiver-a behavior they apparently found remarkable in some way.
Both of these studies demonstrate infants' ability to generate rich interpretations from sparse objective information. Both studies also demonstrate that infants differ in their responses to negative and positive social interactions. Nonetheless, to the extent that the responsive and unresponsive test displays carry other correlated information (e.g., approach vs. withdrawal), it is possible that infants differ more by their reactions to those objective differences, than by differences in internally projected construals. To address this possibility, we ran one additional study, in which the test events were themselves as neutral as possible. To the extent that infants construed one as more preferable, positive, or expected than the other, they had to project that information onto the events themselves, based on information in the habituation events. To accomplish this, we created two events very much like the test outcomes in the first study, shown in Figure 2 . In one, a red, triangular mother figure reacted responsively to an infant's cry of distress by returning down a hill to the infant's side. In the other, a green, square mother figure reacted unresponsively to the infant's cry by ignoring it and moving further up the hill. In the test trials, the two mother figures were displayed side by side on a blank screen. In one trial the infant figure approached the red triangle; in the other the infant figure approached the green triangle. Both test trials involved approaches by a little figure to a big figure.
Objectively, the only difference between the two test trials was that in one, the blue oval approached a red triangle and in the other the blue oval approached a green square. Yet once again our infant participants construed the displays in accordance with their own attachment experiences. Securely attached infants found it remarkable to see the infant figure join the previously unresponsive green square. Conversely, insecurely attached infants found it much more remarkable to see the infant figure join the previously responsive red triangle. Both groups of infants seemed to interpret the larger figures as a caregiver and a noncaregiver, but which was which depended on their point of view.
Taken together, the data from these studies constitute the first independent evidence that infants' attachment behaviors are related to their abstract representations of caregiver and infant behavior. In addition, who they thought should (or would) do what with whom was a matter of some subjective construal.
Oxytocin, Genetics, and Socioemotional Information Processing
It may seem counterintuitive to discuss a role for genetic effects on attachment formation after arguing that attachment status is tightly linked to specific, subjective construals of social interactions. And indeed, behavior geneticists' attempts to account for the missing variance in infants' attachment status with genetic factors have had only mixed success. Whereas some twin studies have suggested small to moderate genetic influences, others have ruled out genetic effects altogether (see Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007 , for a review of this literature).
Recent advances in molecular genetics, however, permit a different, more promising, approach to the examination of genetic influences on attachment. Polymorphisms in genes involved in the production, transport, and metabolism of many neurotransmitters and brain substances have now been related to a variety of mental health outcomes, including psychiatric conditions (cf. Caspi & Moffitt, 2006) , but also normal variations in stress reactivity (Gotlib, Joormann, Minor, & Hallmayer, 2008) and shyness and behavioral inhibition . Several studies have found associations between attachmentrelevant behavior and polymorphisms related to dopamine and serotonin in both adults (Gillath, Shaver, Baek, & Chun, 2008; and children (Bakermans-Kranenberg & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Barry, Kochanska, & Philibert, 2008; Gervai et al., 2007; van IJzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenberg, 2006) . Genetic variation in the same neurotransmitter systems has also been associated Figure 1 . Schematics of the animated displays used to test infants' expectations of caregiver responsiveness or unresponsiveness in a separation event . Figure 2 . Schematics of the animated displays used to test infants' construals of infant behavior given prior knowledge of caregiver responsiveness or unresponsiveness .
with subtle differences in attentional processes Sheese, Voelker, Rothbart, & Posner, 2007) . Another promising target of inquiry is oxytocin and its receptors. Oxytocin is a neuropeptide produced in the hypothalamus and projected via axon transmission into the amygdala and its associated areas where the oxytocin receptor is found (Insel, 1997; Winslow & Insel, 2002) . In animals, oxytocin has been found to influence a host of mammalian social behaviors including mother-infant attachment, pair bonding, social recognition, and social communication (Ferguson et al., 2000; Insel, 1997; Lim & Young, 2006; Takayanagi et al., 2005; Winslow & Insel, 2002) . Indeed, both oxytocin and oxytocin-receptor-knockout mice show severe deficits in social behavior (Takayanagi et al., 2005; Winslow & Insel, 2002) .
There is now also ample evidence indicating that oxytocin plays an important role in social information processing in humans. Intranasally administered oxytocin has been found to increase healthy adults' attention to the eye region of faces (Guastella, Mitchell, & Dadds, 2008) , to enhance their ability to infer mental states from eye-related information (Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, Berger, & Herpertz, 2007) , to strengthen their memory for emotional faces (Savaskan, Ehrhardt, Schulz, Walter, & Schachinger, 2008) , and to facilitate their recognition of positive social words (Unkelbach, Guastella, & Forgas, 2008) . Intravenous administration of oxytocin has been found to improve the ability of patients with autism to recognize the emotional intonation of speech (Hollander et al., 2007) .
Oxytocin has also been shown to influence adults' social expectations. In one study, adults who received a dose of oxytocinladen nasal spray accepted greater risk from unseen human partners and trusted them with more of their own money than they did unseen interactive computers (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005) . In another study, Buchheim et al. found that the intranasal administration of oxytocin increased the experience of attachment-related security in previously insecure adults (Buchheim et al., 2009) .
Several imaging studies have confirmed that the effects of oxytocin in healthy adults are mediated, at least in part, by the amygdala (Domes et al., 2007; Kirsch et al., 2005; Petrovic, Kalisch, Singer, & Dolan, 2008) , a region known previously for its involvement in processing emotionally valenced information. Among other things, and important for our purposes, is the conclusion that oxytocin seems to attenuate the amygdala's response to threatening stimuli.
Perhaps most compelling of all for the present purposes are findings that implicate oxytocin in the retention, or rather the lack of retention, of aversive stimuli. Studies have demonstrated that the administration of oxytocin produces amnesia for aversive experiences, such as foot-shock in rodents (Boccia, Kopf, & Baratti, 1998; de Wied, 1965) and physical pain in humans (Heinrichs, Meinlschmidt, Wippich, Ehlert, & Hellhammer, 2004) . Also in humans, Petrovic et al. aversively conditioned adults to a series of human faces and then showed that the administration of oxytocin prevented the retention of the negative associations (Petrovic et al., 2008) . Similarly, Baumgartner et al. produced apparent amnesia of social betrayal in a social economic game. Experimenters deliberately fed evidence of a partner's duplicity to participants, who nonetheless showed no decrease in trust, and no increase in amygdala activity if given doses of oxytocin, in contrast to placebo controls who showed both (Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008) .
Polymorphisms exist in the genes for both oxytocin and its receptor. Recent work in autism has shown associations between that disorder of socioemotional development and single nucleotide polymorphisms within the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene (Jacob et al., 2007; Lerer et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2005) . Motivated by this work, several studies have explored the influence of oxytocin polymorphisms on normal social functioning in healthy adults. Israel et al. (Israel et al., 2009) found OXTR polymorphism associations with prosocial behavior and trust in a social decision-making game. Three recent studies have explored OXTR's association with attachmentrelated phenomena. In adults, Bakermans-Kranenberg and van found that the G allele at the rs53576 locus within the OXTR gene was associated with more sensitive parenting behavior, though in contrast, Gillath et al. (Gillath et al., 2008) found no association between the same OXTR polymorphism and adults' reports of their own attachment. In infants, Johnson et al. (Johnson, Chen, Barth, Johnson, & Gotlib, 2010) found that the rs2254298 locus was associated with secure attachment.
Oxytocin Receptor Polymorphisms and Socioemotional Information Processing in Preverbal Infants
Motivated by the influence of oxytocin on the processing of socially relevant information in animals and adults, particularly the response to and retention of negative stimuli, we have begun exploring whether similar phenomena may be observable in infants, particularly in the context of attachment. Because this is essentially an individual-differences issue we have addressed three related questions: Are individual differences in attentional biases to emotion associated with individual differences in attachment? Are individual differences in attentional biases to emotion associated with individual differences in the oxytocin system? And finally, are individual differences in these attentional biases associated with individual differences in infants' visual expectations of caregiver responsiveness as tested by our animated displays? . Although it is not feasible to administer oxytocin to healthy infants, the tools of molecular genetics are readily applied to this population.
To begin exploring this topic, Chen and Johnson (2010) tested 64 12-month-old infants on an emotion-based attentional-orienting task. We predicted that the attention of insecurely attached infants would be more captured by negative emotions than the attention of securely attached infants. Pictures of a woman's face expressing happy, neutral, or fearful emotions appeared briefly (1 s) in the center of a computer screen followed immediately by the appearance of an abstract geometric target on the right or left of the screen. The number of milliseconds it took infants to disengage their gaze from the location of the face to shift it to the target was calculated. As predicted, insecurely attached infants (n = 31) were significantly slower to shift their overt attention away from the location of the fearful face than either the neutral or happy face, while securely attached infants showed no significant impact of emotional expression. Infants were then categorized on the basis of whether it took them longer to disengage from fearful (thereby showing a "fear-bias") or happy faces (showing a "happy-bias"). Securely attached infants were evenly split, half and half, as would be expected if their attention were uninfluenced by the two emotions. Conversely, fully three quarters of the insecurely attached infants displayed a fear bias. At least by these measures, individual differences in the attention to emotion are associated with individual differences in attachment status.
To address whether differences in the oxytocin system are associated with these differences in emotion-attention relations, we genotyped 45 of the infants in Chen and Johnson's study at the rs2254298 and rs53576 loci of the oxytocin receptor gene. Consistent with the association between OXTR and attachment status discussed above , an association between attentional capture and polymorphisms at the rs2254298 locus was also found. Infants who were homozygous for the G allele showed a strong bias to the fearful face that was both significant and different from the pattern produced by the infants with at least one A allele, who showed the reverse, though nonsignificant, bias to the happy face (see Figure 3) .
Both OXTR and security of attachment were thus correlated with the degree of fear bias in the infants tested. We included OXTR and security of attachment in a single regression analysis of infants' fear biases in order to test whether their effects were overlapping or independent. We found only a significant effect of OXTR, suggesting that the variability among infants previously credited to differences in attachment status may be more appropriately attributed to differences in OXTR. These results tentatively suggest that individual differences in the oxytocin system are indeed associated with the interplay between emotionand attention in infants, as was predicted from the adultand animal literature. They further suggest that the gene-emotion relationship is probably not mediated by attachment, but rather the reverse-that the differences in the emotion-attention processes drive differences in attachment.
These findings are consistent with the proposal that individual differences in genetically grounded emotion-attention relations bias infants' construals of parenting which in turn bias the formation of attachment. However, this argument would be stronger still if the relationship between these emotionattention biases and infants' construals of attachment were measured more directly.
To this end, we offer one final piece of support. A subset of 25 infants participated in both the emotion-attention procedure and the visual habituation of caregiver responsiveness study, allowing us to test whether differences in the impact of emotion on infants' attention was associated with differences in infants' internal working models. Single summary scores were calculated for each task, to allow us to test the possible associations between them. For the emotion-attention task, we calculated two bias scores relative to neutral for each infant-a fear bias and a happy bias. A positive score indicated that the infant was more captured by that particular valenced expression than by the neutral expression. For the habituation task, a single score was calculated by subtracting the time an infant spent looking at the unresponsive-caregiver test trials from the responsive-caregiver test trials. Infants with positive scores were thus those who showed the "insecure" pattern, and infants with negative scores showed the "secure" pattern. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 4a . Infants whose attention was captured by fear were also significantly more likely to look longer at the responsive caregiver behavior than the unresponsive. Infants whose attention was not captured by fear showed the opposite pattern. Attentional capture by happy faces was not related to infants' construal of the caregiver behaviors in the test trials. It was, however, significantly related to how attentive infants were to the separation events in the initial trials of the habituation phase of the study. Infants who were captured by the happy face attended considerably longer than did infants without a happy bias (see Figure 4b) .
These data support the notion that subtle differences in infants' attention to emotional expressions are associated with their construals of social interactions. The exact nature of this association is of course unknown. The attentional biases may themselves filter social information and thus have a direct causal influence on infants' interpretations of actors and interactions. Alternatively, these biases may be indices of a more primary evaluative process, such as fear conditioning, that directly affects infants' learning about all social interactions.
Discussion
We have reviewed a series of preliminary experiments designed to assess the relationship between individual differences in Figure 3 . Infants' relative attentional capture by a fearful expression as a function of whether they had at least one A allele or were homozygous for the G allele at the rs2254298 locus of the OXTR gene. attachment status, socioemotional information processing, and genotype in 1-year-olds. We found that infants' behavior in the strange situation corresponded closely to (a) their subjective construals of the behavior of generic social actors in separation and reunion events, (b) individual differences in attentional biases to fearful and happy emotional expressions, and (c) allelic variations at the rs2254298 locus of the OXR gene. We also found that (d) statistically, the genetic variable accounted for the differences in attentional biases more directly than did attachment security, and (e) variations in infants' attentional biases to emotion were associated with their interpretations of the behavior of social actors.
The established evidence that oxytocin promotes amnesia for aversive stimuli as discussed above provides us with a framework to explain how and why this cluster of outcomes might hang together. Securely attached infants may enjoy less sensitivity to threatening faces and relatively sparse representations of negative social interactions, not only because they enjoy more positive caregiving than other infants, but also because they possess a gene that "immunizes" them against the instances of aversive caregiving, however few or many, that they must also surely have. Across all our studies, and in our particular population, these "amnesic" outcomes tended to track with the A allele at the OXTR rs2254298 locus, suggesting that this allele is in some way associated with higher levels of available oxytocin in the brain. The theoretical upshot of such a framework for attachment theorists then, is that objectively identical parenting behavior may nonetheless result in subjectively different experiences and internal working models for infants, depending on the infants' genotypes.
The individual differences identified here-differences in perceiving and attending to negative and positive stimuli, that are grounded in biology and stable over development-resemble temperamental differences. However, the role we envision for these differences in the formation of attachment status strikes us as different in quality to what other temperament theories have offered over the years. For one, we are persuaded, not least of all by the evidence we have presented on infants' mental representations of caregiver-infant interactions, that the major classifications of behavior in the strange situation are not simply artifacts of temperamental differences (Goldsmith & Alansky, 1987; Kagan, 1995) . Nor do we think that transactional theories that emphasize the infant's role in eliciting different parenting styles (e.g., Mangelsdorf, Gunnar, Kestenbaum, Lang, & Andreas, 1990) capture the current phenomena, to the extent that they maintain an emphasis on objective parenting styles alone, albeit child-elicited.
The individual differences perspective that we would like to add is one of representational subjectivity. Individual differences in how infants perceive, encode, and ultimately represent objectively similar parenting may be driving at least some of the differences in behavior measured in the strange situation.
Though we did not measure environmental influences directly in the studies described here, there is every reason to believe that the genetic differences seen in the oxytocin system do ultimately interact with the environment. Such expected findings would join a growing number of gene-by-environment interactions now found in the literature, particularly findings on interactions between temperament and parenting. To name only a few examples, allelic variations in the serotonin transporter gene correspond to whether overstressed parenting drives a child to become behaviorally more inhibited or disinhibited ; allelic differences in dopamine receptors correspond to how sensitive and responsive children are to either harsh or positive parenting (Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, Pijlman, Mesman, & Juffer, 2008) ; and differences in fearful temperament dictate whether gentle or firm parenting techniques more effectively promote healthy conscience development (Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007) . Whether the geneby-environment interaction in the case of oxytocin takes the Figure 4 . (a) Infants' relative attention to the responsive and unresponsive caregiver test displays in the habituation task as a function of whether they showed a fear bias in the attention-emotion task. (b) Infants' attention to the first three trials of the separation events in the habituation phases of the habituation task as a function of whether they showed a happy bias in the attention-emotion task.
form of a genetic vulnerability or differential susceptibility remains to be seen , 2007 Fearon & Belsky, 2004; Fox et al., 2005; Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007) .
We have offered only a preliminary sketch of some of the unstudied processes that may be at work in infants' developing attachments to their caregivers. Though we have focused on the case of attachment, the implications for development more generally are clear. Infants are subjective individuals with their own personal perspectives and experiences of the world. Genotypic variations, not only in the oxytocin system, but surely in other neurotransmitter systems as well, impact the emotional weight and relevance of an individual's experiences from the very beginning of life, setting the stage for meaningful individual differences in not only personality, but also social and cognitive development.
